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Piggyback Jurisdiction in the Proposed
Federal Criminal Code
The federal criminal law is currently a chaotic collection of statutes
enacted piecemeal over the past two centuries. Although there have
been several attempts at codification, the result in each case has been
little more than a rearrangement of the existing provisions.' In recog-
nition of the continuing need for revision, Congress in 1966 created
the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, with
a broad mandate to revise and recodify the current statutes.2 The Com-
mission took its task seriously; in January 1971 it submitted tile final
draft of a proposed Federal Criminal Code which, if enacted, would
constitute a major reform.3
The proposed Code departs significantly from present law in its
treatment of federal jurisdiction. The Code simplifies and makes con-
sistent existing jurisdictional provisions, and in addition includes a
provision for "piggyback" jurisdiction, 4 which would permit federal
prosecution of a broad range of common crimes, normally punishable
only by the states, when committed in association with federal offenses.
The Commission justifies the piggyback provision as a rational and
convenient solution to certain drafting problems inherent in a federal
code.5 Critics, on the other hand, claim that it constitutes an unvar-
ranted expansion of federal authority into the state domain.0 This
1. There have been three such recodifications: the Revised Statutes of 1873-74. Act
of June 20, 1874, ch. 333, 18 Stat. 113; the Penal Code of 1909, Act of March 4, 1909, ch.
321, 35 Stat. 1088; and the revision of 1948, Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683
(codified at 18 U.S.C. (1970)). For a survey of the history of the federal criminal law.
see McClellan, Codification, Reform, and Revision: The Challenge of a Modern Federal
Criminal Code, 1971 DUKE L.J. 663 (1971). Senator McClellan is Chairman of the Sub-
committee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
and was a member of the National Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws.
His article is based on a speech he gave before the Senate introducing the Commission's
proposed Federal Criminal Code, 117 CoNe. Rac. S. 2955-3006 (daily ed.. Mar. 11, 1971).
2. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89.801, 80 Stat. 1516, as amended, Act of July 8,
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-39, 83 Stat. 44.
3. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION oN REIFORM OF FEDErAL C IMINAL LAWS
(1971) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]. The FINAL REPORT is reprinted in Hearings
on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as Hearings]. The FINAL REPORT includes the full text of the Commission's
proposed Federal Criminal Code [hereinafter cited as CODE]. An earlier draft of the Code
is presented in NATIONAL COMMIssION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY
DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1970) [hereinafter cited as STUDY DRAFT].
4. CODE § 201(b).
5. See McClellan, supra note I, at 696-98.
6. Younger, State v. Uncle Sam, 58 A.B.A.J. 155 (1972); Liebmann, Chartering a Na-
tional Police Force, 56 A.B.A.J. 1070 (1970); National Association of Attorneys General,
Disapproval of Study Draft of Proposed New Federal Criminal Code, printed in Hearings
6-11.
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Note will explore the functions of the piggyback provision, its con-
stitutionality, and its implications for the scope and exercise of federal
prosecutorial power.
I. The Proposed Code's Approach to Jurisdiction
A. The General Jurisdictional Framework
Unlike the states, the federal government does not have plenary
criminal jurisdiction. Rather, it is limited to regulating criminal be-
havior that is in some way related to one of the constitutionally dele-
gated federal powers.7 Federal criminal statutes have traditionally
taken account of this limitation by including the requisite jurisdic-
tional factors within the definition of each offense. The Lindbergh
Law, for example, does not reach kidnapping per se, but instead makes
transportation of a kidnapped victim in interstate commerce a federal
offense.8
This traditional approach raises several problems. First, it has occa-
sionally led courts to treat jurisdictional factors as elements of the
substantive offense. Under the mail fraud statute, for example, it has
been held that an offender can be sentenced separately for each item
mailed, regardless of the severity of the underlying fraud.9 Similarly,
courts have occasionally held that the government must prove that the
defendant was aware of the particular jurisdictional factor that made
the offense federal.' 0
More significantly, the present approach has led to substantial incon-
sistencies in the definitions, penalties, and jurisdictional bases for sub-
stantive offenses. For example, there now exist at least eleven different
federal assault statutes, each associated with a different jurisdictional
base.'" Some of these statutes define only one form of assault,1 2 while
others prescribe up to five different degrees of that offense.13 The
maximum punishment imposed by these statutes varies from one 4 to
7. See p. 1216 infra.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1970).
9. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916); Milan v. United States, 322 F.2d 101
(Sth Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 911 (1964).
10. It has been held, for example, that conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1970) for
assaulting a federal officer requires proof that the defendant knew the victin was a federal
officer, United States v. Bell, 219 F. Supp. 260 (E.D.N.Y. 1963), though most courts seem
to have taken the contrary view, see Burke v. United States, 400 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 919 (1969).
11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112, 113, 1153, 1501, 1655, 1751, 2113, 2114, 2116, and 2191 (1970).
12. Id. § 2113(d) (assault in the course of committing a bank robbery).
13. Id. § 113 (assault within maritime and territorial jurisdiction).
14. Id. § 1501 (assault on a process server).
1210
Vol. 81: 1209, 1972
Piggyback Jurisdiction in the Proposed Federal Criminal Code
twenty-five years. 15 Assault on a mail clerk may violate up to three dif-
ferent statutes, 16 but assaulting a cabinet officer is not a federal offense
at all." Furthermore, when taken as a whole, the existing federal assault
statutes protect a substantially broader class of potential victims than
do the federal murder statutes.' s Many of these anomalies could obvi-
ously be eliminated by carefully redrafting the existing provisions,
while still maintaining the traditional practice of defining jurisdic-
tional bases together with substantive elements of federal offenses. Yet
the opportunity for haphazard development through piecemeal legis-
lation would remain, and new anomalies would undoubtedly develop.19
The authors of the proposed Code responded to this difficulty by
taking a different approach to jurisdiction, separating the definitions
of criminal conduct from the definitions of the circumstances that give
rise to federal jurisdiction. Common crimes such as murder, theft, and
arson are defined only once, as in a state code, and the definition of
each offense is followed by a separate provision outlining the bases for
federal jurisdiction over that offense. Furthermore, the most frequently
invoked jurisdictional bases are set forth in a separate section at the be-
ginning of the Code, § 201,20 and are simply incorporated by reference
15. Id. § 2113(d), see note 12 supra.
16. Id. §§ 111, 2114, and 2116.
17. Conspiracy to assault a cabinet member, however, would be covered by 18 U.S.C.
§ 372 (1970).
18. See Comment on Homicide, 2 VOatING PAPERS OF TIlE NATIONAL COMMISSION Onq
REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAwS 823, 832 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WoRKuu'c PAPERS].
For a discussion of other oddities in the existing law, see Schwartz, Federal Criminal
Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAw & CoxmFp. PROn. 64, 77-80 (1948);
Abrams, Consultant's Report on Jurisdiction, I WoRKINc PAPERS 33, 40.42.
19. See Abrams, supra note 18, at 40.
20. Section 201 reads, in full, as follows:
§ 201. Common Jurisdictional Bases.
Federal jurisdiction to penalize an offense under this Code exists under the circum-
stances which are set forth as the jurisdictional base or bases for that offense.
Bases commonly used in this Code are as follows:
(a) the offense is committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States as defined in section 210;
(b) the offense is committed in the course of committing or in immediate flight
from the commission of any other offense defined in this Code over which federaljurisdiction exists;
(c) the victim is a federal public servant engaged in the performance of his
official duties or is the President of the United States, the President-elect, the Vice
President, or, if there is no Vice President, the officer next in the order of succession
to the office of President of the United States, the Vice President.elect or any indi-
vidual who is acting as President under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, a candidate for President or Vice President, or an) member or member-
designate of the President's cabinet, or a member of Congress, or a federal judge,
or a head of a foreign nation or a foreign minister, ambassador or other public
minister;
(d) the property which is the subject of the offense is owned by or in the cus-
tody or control of the United States or is being manufactured, constructed or stored
for the United States;
(e) the United States mails or a facility in interstate or foreign commerce is used
in the commission or consummation of the offense;
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in the various substantive provisions to which they are applicable. For
example, the Code contains only two assault offenses-simple and ag-
gravated.2 1 A separate paragraph following each definition provides
that federal jurisdiction exists over these offenses under four of the
common jurisdictional bases, including § 201(a) ("the offense is com-
mitted within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States .. .") and § 201(c) ("the victim is a federal public servant
engaged in the performance of his official duties...,,).2
This technique effectively cures the anomalies noted above. Since
common crimes are defined only once, inconsistencies in definitions
and penalties are eliminated. Similarly, disparities in the jurisdictional
breadth of various substantive offenses, such as presently exist with
respect to murder and assault, have generally been removed by assign-
ing them identical jurisdictional bases.23 Furthermore, the bases them-
selves have been defined with a degree of generality that eliminates
such anomalies as the lack of protection for cabinet members. 2 4 Finally,
the clear distinction between the definition of substantive offenses and
the provision for jurisdictional bases insures that the latter will not
become confused with the elements of the offense, thereby avoiding
the distortions engendered by the current method of drafting.23
Though of considerable importance, these changes do not entail a
radical shift in the treatment of federal criminal jurisdiction. Each
substantive offense is still tied to a limited number of specific juris-
(0 the offense is against a transportation, conmnication, or power facility
of interstate or foreign commerce or against a United States mail facility;
(g) the offense affects interstate or foreign commerce;
(h) movement of any person across a state or United States boundary occurs it
the commission or consummation of the offense;(i) the property which is the subject of the offense is moving in interstate or
foreign commerce or constitutes or is part of an interstate or foreign shipment:
(j) the property which is the subject of the offense is moved across a state or
United States boundary in the commission or consummation of the offense;
(k) the property which is the subject of the offense is owned by or in the cus,
tody of a national credit institution;
(1) the offense is committed under circumstances amounting to piracy, as pre.
scribed in section 212.
When no base is specified for an offense, federal jurisdiction exists if the offense is
committed anywhere within the United States, or within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
21. CODE §§ 1611, 1612.
22. CODE §§ 1611(3), 1612(2).
23. This is not to say that inconsistencies in jurisdiction have been entirely eliminated
from the proposed Code. Sometimes the Commission has refused to let the rationalizing
process overcome allegiance to the jurisdictional contours of the present law. For example,
the Code provides for jurisdiction over kidnapping, but not murder, when "movement of
any person across a state or United States boundary occurs in the commission or consutisi
mation of the offense" (CODE § 201(h)). CODE §§ 1634, 1609.
24. See CODE § 201(c), quoted note 20 supra.
25. To avoid such judicial distortions, the Code specifically provides that culpability
need not be proven with regard to jurisdictional factors. CODE §§ 204, 302(3)(c).
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dictional bases. Furthermore, most of these bases are similar to those
presently employed.20 For the most part, any expansion of federal juris-
diction created by the Code derives from the process of generalizing the
jurisdictional bases and reducing their number in order to avoid the
gaps and inconsistencies in the old approach. -7
Insofar as the Code's approach does expand fedeal jurisdiction, it
reflects the Commission's view that controlling the exercise of prose-
cutorial discretion is often a better method of restricting federal power
than the traditional approach of limiting jurisdiction. This view is
reflected in § 207,28 a novel provision that describes the circumstances
under which federal authorities may refrain from prosecuting when
there is concurrent federal and state jurisdiction.2 0
26. In this respect, the FINAL REPORT is somewhat more restrained than the earlier
STUDY DRAFr, which occasionally provided jurisdictional bases for offenses to which they
do not apply either in the existing law or in the FINAL RErort. Compare CODE § l363
with STUDY DRAFr § 1368 (setting forth jurisdictional bases for local corruption offenses).
27. It is difficult to judge precisely how much of an expansion in jurisdiction Is actu-
ally involved. In some cases it appears to be considerable. For example, in place of the
particularistic theft offenses in the existing law tile Code contains a series of general theft
provisions, CODE §§ 1731-1734, for which jurisdiction is provided under all but two of
the common jurisdictional bases, CODE §§ 201(c) and 201(0, see note 20 supra. (Jurisdic.
tion over theft offenses is defined in CODE §1 1740). One factor that complicates an) judg.
ment as to the breadth of federal jurisdicton under the Code is that the scope ol sev-
eral of the broader jurisdictional bases, such as CODE §§ 201(e) and 201(g), will depend
in large part on the manner in which they are interpreted.
28. Section 207 reads, in full, as follows:
§ 207. Discretionary Restraint in Exercise of Concurrent Jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding the existence of concurrent jurisdiction, federal law enforcement
agencies are authorized to decline or discontinue federal enforcement efforts when-
ever the offense can effectively be prosecuted by nonfederal agencies and it appears
that there is no substantial federal interest in further prosecution or that the offense
primarily affects state, local or foreign interests. A substantial federal interest exists
in the following circumstances, among others:
(a) the offense is serious and state or local law enforcement is impeded by
interstate aspects of the case; (b) federal enforcement is believed to be necessary
to vindicate federally protected civil rights; (c) if federal jurisdiction exists under
section 201(b), the offense is closely related to the underlying offense as to which
there is a substantial federal interest; (d) an offense apparently limited in its
impact is believed to be associated with organized criminal activities extending
beyond state lines; (e) state or local law enforcement has been so corrupted as
to undermine its effectiveness substantially.
Where federal law enforcement efforts are discontinued in deference to state, local
or foreign prosecution, federal agencies are directed to cooperate with state, local or
foreign agencies, by providing them with evidence already gathered or otherwvise, to
the extent that this is practicable without prejudice to federal law enforcement. The
Attorney General is authorized to promulgate additional guidelines for the exercise
of discretion in employing federal criminal jurisdiction. The presence or absence of
a federal interest and any other question relating to the exercise of the discretion
referred to in this section are for the prosecuting authorities alone and are not
litigable.
Section 207 and its implications for federal enforcement are discussed at pp. 1232-33
infra.
29. In its general approach to the problem of jurisdiction-including the separation
of jurisdictional matters from the definition of offenses, the provision for broader and
more consistent jurisdiction over common crimes, and the establishment of explicit policy
restraints on the use of prosecutorial discretion-the Code follows the suggestions made
in Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAw & Co.-
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B. Piggyback Jurisdiction
The piggyback provision of the Code, however, provides a new
though not unprecedented 30 area of federal jurisdiction. The provision
would create federal jurisdiction over offenses committed "in the
course of committing or in immediate flight from the commission of
any other offense defined in [the] Code over which federal jurisdiction
exists." 3 ' The crimes which could thus be piggybacked onto other
Code offenses (the latter termed "underlying" offenses) consist pri-
marily of common crimes against persons, such as homicide, assault,
kidnapping, and rape (set out in Chapter 16 of the Code), and common
crimes against property, such as arson, burglary, robbery, and theft
(set out in Chapter 17). Thus, if an escaping federal prisoner were to
kill someone during the course of his escape, the pigyback provision
would permit federal prosecution for the homicide as well as for the
escape.32
As the Commission notes, there is substantial precedent for piggy-
back jurisdiction. The Federal Bank Robbery Act, enacted in 1934,
provides for an additional sentence when the offender assaults, kidnaps,
or kills someone "in committing" a bank robbery.33 Similarly, a num-
ber of federal offenses, including the major civil rights offenses3'1 and
several crimes involving destruction of facilities used in interstate com-
merce, 35 carry aggravated penalties "if death results" or "if personal
injury results." Even stronger precedent for the piggyback provision,
though not mentioned by the Commission, is § 7 of the Enforcement
Act of 1870.36 That section, codified as R.S. 5509,37 authorized aggra-
TEM'. PROB. 64 (1948). Professor Schwartz was the Staff Director for the Commission
that prepared the Code. His article is still the most thoughtful treatment of the sub.
ject of federal criminal jurisdiction. See also Allen, Kenison, Willens & Schwartz, Role of
the Federal, State and Local Governments in the Administration of Griminal Justlice- A
Panel, 1961 REt,., A.B.A. SEarzoN OF CRIMINAL LAw 30; Abrams, Consultant's Report onl
Jurisdiction, 1 WORKING P'AIErs 33. None of these discussions, however, considers anything
like the Commission's proposed piggyback provision.
30. See pp. 1214-16 infra.
31. CODE § 201(b).
32. The applicable provisions would be CODE §§ 1601 (murder) and 1306 (escape).
33. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(d), (e) (1970).
34. Id. §§ 241, 242, 245(b).
35. Id. §§ 34, 844(i), 1992. See also id. §§ 844(d) (interstate transport of explosives),
844(f) (destruction of federal facilities). Other piggyback-type statutes provide for a sepa.
rate sentence of from one to ten years for employing a firearm, id. § 924(c), or explosives,
id. § 844(h), in the commission of any federal felony.
36. An Act to enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to vote in the several
States of this Union and for other P'urposes, May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
37. Rev. Stat. § 5509, Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 333, 18 Stat. 113 (2d ed. 1878, authorized
by Act of March 2, 1877, ch. 82, 19 Stat. 268, as amended, Act of March 9, 1878, ch. 26,
20 Stat. 27).
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vation of sentences according to the penalties provided by state law
when a state crime was committed "in the act of violating" either of
two civil rights statutes.38 The experience with R.S. 5509,30 which was
38. Section 5 of the Enforcement Act (subsequently codified as R.S. 5507) made it a
misdemeanor to hinder any individual in the exercise of the right of suffrage guaranteed
by the Fifteenth Amendment. Section 6 (R.S. 5508), now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970),
made it a felony, punishable by up to ten years in prison, to conspire to interfere with
any citizen in the free exercise of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States. Section 7 (R.S. 5509) then effectively pigg)backced the
criminal law of each state onto the two preceding sections:
If in the act of violating any provision in either of the two preceding sections any
other felony or misdemeanor be committed, the offender shall be punished for the
same with such punishment as is attached to such felony or misdemeanor by the
laws of the State in which the offense is committed.
Rev. Stat. § 5509, note 37 supra.
The legislative history of R.S. 5509 is rather sparse. R.S. 5507, 5508, and 5509 were intro-
duced together in the Senate as amendments to the Enforcement Act. Their sponsor,
Senator Pool, said little about R.S. 5509 other than that it would lend extra force to the
other two provisions and that it was particularly necessary because local enforcement
would often be inadequate for the offenses it would cover. Co.G. GLoBE, 41st Cong., 2d
Sess. 3612-13 (1870). (Senator Pool's remarks are also reproduced in an appendix to the
Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 816 (1965).) Although the
Enforcement Act as a whole was assailed at length by southern legislators as a usurpation
of state jurisdiction, there was little explicit criticism of R.S. 55U9 itself. But Jee Cost.
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3804, 3873 (1870).
R.S. 5509 differs from the piggyback provisions contained in the Code, in that it piggy-
backed state penalties onto federal crimes rather than utilizing federally-defined offensts
for this purpose. Moreover, it piggybacked all such crimes rather than a specified category
of them, although the proposed Code in fact permits piggybacking for most of the major
crimes covered by state law. The available set of underlying offenses was much narrower,
however, encompassing only R.S. 5507 and 5508, rather than the entire federal code. From
the reported cases it appears that R.S. 5509 was in fact used only in conjunction with R.S.
5508, apparently because the constitutionality of R.S. 5507 was thrown in considerable
doubt soon after its passage by the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Reese,
92 US. 214 (1875), which struck down other similar provisions from the same act. Later
decisions explicitly declared R.S. 5507 itself invalid. James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127
(1903); Lackey v. United States, 107 F. 114 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 181 US. 621 (1901).
These distinctions notwithstanding, the operative principles of the pigg)back provision
and R.S. 5509 are quite similar. If anything, the function of sentence grading. advanced
by the Commission as a justification for piggybacking, see note 93 injra, is even more
explicit in the older statute, since by its terms it simply aggravated the penalty for the
underlying federal offense rather than permitting separate federal punishment for the
state offense. Although the language of R.S. 5509 did not compel that interpretation, it
was the view taken by the courts, at least when the issue was confronted directly. See
Davis v. United States, 107 F. 753 (6th Cir. 1901), discussed at p. 1217 infra. The effect
would be much the same no matter which interpretation were used, since the elements
of the state offense would have to be proven in any case. Cf. Motes v. United States,
178 US. 458 (1900).
The similarity of the two provisions is further emphasized by the fact that R-S. 550S,
one of the two underlying offenses for R.S. 5509, is one of the civil rights offenses that
the authors of the Code have singled out as being particularly appropriate for the appli-
cation of piggybacking. See note 93 in ra.
39. During the forty years that it was in force R.S. 5509 was employed not only in
prosecuting for serious misconduct interfering with the rights of blacks, Rakes v. United
States, 212 U.S. 55 (1909); Riggins v. United States, 199 U.S. 547 (1905); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); United States v. Avery, 80 U.S. 251 (1872); United States v.
Powell, 151 F. 648 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1907), afJ'd per curiam, 212 U.S. 564 (1909); but also
in prosecuting for the murder or attempted murder of federal witnesses, informants, and
law enforcement officers, United States v. Mason, 213 U.S. 115 (1909); Motes v. United
States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); United States v. Sanges,
144 U.S. 310 (1892); Davis v. United States, 107 F. 753 (6th Cir. 1901); United States v.
Patrick, 54 F. 338 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1893). The reason for these federal prosecutions was
evidently that adequate local enforcement was not forthcoming, presumably because in
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later repealed,4 0 led the Attorney General to recommend in 1890 that
it be
so broadened as to make any felony committed while in the act
of violating any statute of the United States triable in the United
States courts, and punishable according to the law of the state
wherein the same is committed. 41
The Code's piggyback provision comes close to meeting that recom-
mendation.
II. The Constitutionality of Piggybacking
Congress can create federal offenses only when their punishment is
"necessary and proper" to the execution of constitutionally delegated
powers.42 The administration of criminal justice is otherwise reserved
to the states under the Tenth Amendment. 43
all but one of these cases, United States v. Mason, supra, the defendants were involved
in evasion of the federal liquor tax, an activity that was probably not unpopular at the
local level. Cf. Davis v. United States, 103 F. 457 (C.CAV.D. Tenn. 1900), afl'd, 107 F. 753
(6th Cir. 1901), where the court specifically noted that, "to its shame," the state hall
never prosecuted for the offense, which involved the murder of a deputy United States
marshal who was attempting to arrest the defendant for illegal distilling. 103 F. at 472.
Such conduct was evidently prosecuted under R.S. 5508 and 5509 because It was not
covered adequately by other provisions in the existing federal law. The provision that
specifically covered interference with federal witnesses carried a maximum sentence of six
years, Rev. Stat. § 5406 (2d ed. 1878), a penalty that undoubtedly seemed inadequate for
murder. See United States v. Sanges, 48 F. 78 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1891), appeal dismilssed 141
U.S. 310 (1892), where, in upholding a demurrer to an indictment under R.S. 5508 antd
5509 for murdering a witness, the court noted that the only effect of its decision was to
force the government to prosecute under R.S. 5406 instead. 48 F. at 83. It seems that at
the time there was no statute at all that directly outlawed the murder of federal officers.
See United States v. Davis, 103 F. 457, 472 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1900), af'd, 107 F. 753 (6th
Cir. 1901). Of course, such prosecutions called for a broad interpretation of R.S. 5508,
which the courts provided in all cases except Sanges, supra.
In light of this history, it is noteworthy that the authors of the piggyback provision
in the proposed Code justify it in part as a means of providing further protection for
federal witnesses and informants. See note 93 infra.
40. R.S. 5509 was repealed when the federal criminal law was recodified in 1909, Act
of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1153, largely as a concession to southern legislatots
who viewed it as an unpleasant remnant of Reconstruction. This and other arguments fit
favor of repeal can be found at 42 CONe.. REC. 591, 616-22, 6419, 2235, 2387-90 (1908).
41. 1890 ATr GEN. ANN. REP. xiii, xiv.
42. For present purposes, the most useful interpretation of the necessary and proper
clause is that given in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). That case involved
a federal criminal statute enacted under the commerce power, but the Cotrt noted the
parallel with the exercise of other powers as well:
Congress, [in legislating under the commerce clause], may choose the means reason.
ably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even though they involve con-
trol of intrastate activities. Such legislation has often been sustained with respect to
powers, other than the commerce power granted to the national government, whenl
the means chosen, although not themselves within the granted power, were never-
theless deemed appropriate aids to the accomplishment of some purpose within all
admitted power of the national government.
312 U.S. at 121.
43. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945); United States v. Fox, 95 U.S.
670 (1877); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). As the Court noted in United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Tenth Amendment adds no further limitation
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Although the cases upholding the constitutionality of R.S. 550914
and the "incidental crimes" provisions of the Federal Bank Robbery
Act -1 strongly suggest the validity of piggyback jurisdiction, they pro-
vide little doctrinal guidance.
R.S. 5509 was upheld on the theory that it did not provide federal
jurisdiction over distinct offenses, but simply permitted aggravation
of the underlying civil rights conspiracy offense.40 It was held that
Congress, having the authority to punish the conspiracy, "was com-
petent to take notice of such incidents of violence and wrong as were
likely to happen in the prosecution of such combinations," and to ad-
just the punishment accordingly. 47 This rationale, however, is of lim-
ited utility in analyzing the piggyback provision. First, it relies on
the distinction between punishment of a separate offense and aggra-
vation of the underlying offense,48 which piggybacking eliminates by
explicitly joining separate offenses. Second, the cases upholding R.S.
5509 fail to explicate the required-relationship between the "incidents
of violence" and the underlying federal offense.
The decisions under the Bank Robbery Act, although affirming
jurisdiction over such remotely related offenses as the subsequent mur-
der of an accomplice to prevent his becoming an informer,40 have gone
to the scope of federal power, but rather "states but a truism that all is retained whict
has not been surrendered." 312 U.S. at 124.
The text focuses on the scope of delegated powers, but an attack oi the pigg)back
provision might also be grounded in substantive due process. The standard to be applied
then would presumably be whether there was a rational connection between punishment
for a piggybacked crime and the protection of an) legitimate federal interest. Such a
rational connection test has continuing vitality in the review of federal criminal statutes
at least where statutory presumptions are concerned. Cf. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S.
6 (1969); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Ashford & Risinger, Presumnptions,
Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Orerieu', 79 YALm.E L.J.
165 (1969). The latter issue, however, is substantially a procedural question. In consider-
ing the substantive limits on Congress' power to punish it seems that the due process
approach is now disfavored, and that courts will limit themselves to dealing with such
issues from the point of view of the scope of delegated powers. Cf. United States v. Perez.
402 U.S. 146 (1971). The fundamental issue, in either case, would be much the same--
whether prosecution for piggybacked offenses is reasonably related to the effectuation of
a federal interest.
44. Rakes v. United States, 212 U.S. 55 (1909); Davis v. United States, 107 F. 753 (6th
Cir. 1901); See also Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900). Seepp. 1214-16 supra.
45. Clark v. United States, 184 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1950). cert. denied, 340 U.S. 955
(1951); Gilmore v. United States, 124 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 661
(1942).
46. As discussed in note 38 supra, R.S. 5509 was employed exclusively in conjunction
with R.S. 5508, the conspiracy statute, and consequently the cases deal with it only in
that context.
47. Rakes v. United States, 212 U.S. 55, 57-58 (1909), quoting from Davis v. United
States, 107 F. 753, 755 (6th Cir. 1901).
48. A concern with this seemingly insignificant distinction can also be found in the
congressional. debate on the repeal of R.S. 5509. 42 CoNc. Rac. 618 (1908).
49. United States v. Etheridge, 424 F.2d 951 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
993 (1971). The Bank Robbery Act extends jurisdiction to murders committed "in avoid-
ing or attempting to avoid apprehension" for the commission of the robbery, 18 U-S.C.
§ 2113(e) (1970), and thus clearly covers the circumstances in Etheridge; it would of course
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no further in defining the required relationship among the offenses
than to state that
[t]ime and place is not the constitutional test, but the relation of
the offense to the robbery. 5°
These cases do, however, suggest the general principle that federal
jurisdiction can extend to an entire criminal transaction 1 once juris-
diction exists over any part of it, regardless of the number of distinct
offenses involved. 52 This formulation in turn suggests two possible
constitutional justifications for piggybacking, each of which involves
the notion of a criminal transaction. The first is based on substantive
federal interests extending to the entire range of the defendant's acts,
the second on procedural considerations focusing on the efficiency and
fairness of a single trial.
A. The Substantive Aspect of "Transaction": Means-Ends Relation-
ships
Full effectuation of the federal interest in regulating conduct clearly
within the scope of delegated powers would seem to require jurisdic-
require some straining to bring that offense within the narrower language of the piggy.
back provision in the proposed Code. The difference in the language of tile two pro.
visions, however, does not detract from the significance of the holding in Etheridge,
which is that federal power can constitutionally extend to even such a remotely related
crime. Under the proposed Code, the Etheridge situation could be handled more directly
as a charge of murder piggybacked onto a charge of tampering with an informant, Cow.
§ 1322.
50. Clark v. United States, 184 F.2d 952, 954 (10th Cir. 1950), cert. dnied, 340 U.S.
955 (1951).
51. The term "transaction" is employed here simply because it has been used previ.
ously to denote a similar concept in other, related areas of the federal criminal law.
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for joinder of offenses
arising from the "same transaction." Federal statutes have granted immunity from sub-
sequent prosecution for any "transaction" as to which an individual has been compelled
to give testimony in a federal proceeding. See Act of Aug. 20, 1951, ch. 769, 68 Stat. 7,15
(repealed 1970); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). And it has been argued,
and occasionally held, that a "same transaction" test should be applied to determine the
scope of the double jeopardy rule. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453.57 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring); J. SIGLER, DouBLE JEOIARDY 67 (1969); Kirchhelmer, The ,Act,
The Offense, and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513 (1949). Tile Code uses the term
"criminal episode" in its provisions covering multiple prosecutions to convey a similar
notion. See pp. 1235-36 infra.
52. The Code's definition of the crime of robbery lends further support to the notion
that the piggyback provision is intended to apply to a single criminal transaction. Section
1721 provides that a person is guilty of robbery if he commits an assault "in the course
of committing" a theft, thereby using the piggyback language to reflect the traditional
notion that a single transaction encompassing both theft and assault constitutes a distinct
offense. The Code's use of the phrase "in the course of committing" is not novel, The
same words are found in the definitions of robber) and burglary in the Model Penal
Code. In fact, the Model Penal Code goes so far as to provide that
A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, lie [assatlts
someone, or] commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony of the first or
second degree.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (Proposed Final Draft, 1962) (emphasis added). See also id.
§ 221.1 (defining burglary).
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tion over other conduct when one of the acts is a means of committing
the other.53 Piggybacked offenses will generally satisfy this criterion.
Most common will be those cases in which the piggybacked offense
is committed as a means of accomplishing the underlying offense. For
example, murder may be the means by which a person is deprived of
his civil rights or prevented from appearing as a witness in a federal
trial. Kidnapping a teller may be a means of assuring the success of a
bank robbery.54
The rationale for imposing an additional penalty when criminal
means are used to secure a federally-forbidden end is clear. An of-
fender who is willing to employ such means will generally represent
a more serious threat to the federal interest which is at stake-for ex-
ample, the electoral process or federally insured bank deposits-than
one who is not, and consequently a higher sentence will be appropriate
for the sake of deterrence, rehabilitation, and isolation of the offender
from society.55
This means-end approach receives strong support from the recent
decision in Perez v. United States,0 which sustained a particularly far-
reaching application of its logic. In that case, the Supreme Court held
that Congress could outlaw loansharking, a class of crime which is
essentially local in character, since it had been found that this crime
was a common means57 of financing interstate organized crime, an
activity clearly within the reach of federal power.5s
53. The same idea can be expressed using the traditional criminal law concept of
intent. That is, full protection of the federal interest in a particular act requires juris-
diction over other acts committed with the intent to commit the prohibited act.
54. A number of existing federal criminal statutes focus explicitly on a ieans.end
relationship. For example, the Hobbs Act, which outlaws any robbery that "affects com-
merce," defines robbery as theft committed "by means of' violence or the threat of
violence. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970). Similarly, it is a federal offense to assault a postal
employee "with intent to" steal the mail. 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (1970). See note 53 supra.
55. See Note, A Rationale of the Law of AggraTated Theft, 54 COLU.. L.R. 84, 102
(1954).
The means-end analysis applies as well to crimes committed "in immediate flight from"
another offense. To take an extreme example, a bank robber might kill a pedestrian while
driving recklessly away from the scene of the crime, and consequently be guilty of negli-
gent homicide. Even in such a case, it could well be argued that driving recklessly was
a means by which the robber sought to elude his pursuers and thus bring the underly-
ing offense to a successful completion, and that this extra measure of %iolence made hint
a more serious offender. Or, put more directly, the government has anl interest in cap-
turing persons who violate its laws, and thus has an interest in punishing a person who
commits an offense in order to avoid such capture.
56. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
57. The holding in Perez goes well beyond the piggyback approach in that it does
not require a showing that the particular offense involved is a means of promoting other
federally proscribed activity, but only that the means-end relationship holds for the class
of offenses taken as a whole. 402 U.S. at 154-57. Clearly, many crimes that would satisfy
the Perez means-end approach could not be said to have been committed "in the course
of committing" a federal offense, as required by the piggyback provision.
58. The Supreme Court's decision in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). re-
flects a similar analysis, expressed in terms of intent, see note 53 supra. There it was
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It may also happen that the underlying offense is the means by which
the piggybacked offense is committed. For example, an offender might
place a bomb aboard a commercial airliner"0 as a means of committing
murder, or impersonate a federal officer in order to commit fraud. In
such cases, federal authority to prosecute for the piggybacked offense
can also be justified as necessary to provide full protection for federal
interests. Thus, impersonation of a federal official is a federal offense
because, when used to commit another offense, it tends to discredit
federal credentials. The degree of this damage is best measured by the
magnitude of the related offense,00 and thus the federal interest is best
vindicated by prosecuting both offenses together. Similarly, Congress
has the authority to outlaw the destruction of commercial aircraft be-
cause it deters the free use of interstate transportation facilities. A
murder connected with such destruction obviously aggravates the in-
terference with the use of those facilities. This reasoning receives sup-
port from the long line of cases under the commerce clause, including
those sustaining the Lottery Act,01 the Mann Act, 02 the National Motor
Vehicle Theft Act, 3 and the Lindbergh Law, 64 which have established
the principle that Congress' authority over interstate commerce carries
with it the authority to punish the criminal ends for which such com-
merce is used.0 5
B. The Procedural Aspect of "Transaction": Pendent Jurisdiction
An alternative constitutional justification for piggybacking derives
from procedural rather than substantive considerations, along lines
analogous to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in civil litigation.
As developed by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs,6 that doctrine permits federal courts to try state claims together
held that, while punishment of murder is generally a matter which is reserved to tie
states, it can become a proper subject for federal sanction when committed with a spe-
cific intent to deprive an individual of his civil rights.
59. Destruction of a commercial airliner could be prosecuted directly under CotE
§ 1702 (endangering by fire or explosion), using as a jurisdictional base CoDE § 201(o (the
offense is against an interstate transportation facility).
60. See United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74 (1915).
61. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
62. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
63. Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
64. Seadlund v. United States, 97 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1938).
65. Further precedent for this substantive interest approach can be found in the federal
statutes permitting defendants to remove state prosecutions to federal courts when sub-
stantial federal interests are involved, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1970) (removal of criminal
cases against officers of the United States); id. § 1442a (removal of criminal cases against
members of the armed forces); id. § 1443 (removal of criminal cases interfering with fed-
erally-protected civil rights). The constitutionality of such statutes is well established,
Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879).
66. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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with federal claims when they "derive from a common nucleus of oper-
ative fact" and "if, considered without regard to their federal or state
character, . . . [the plaintiff] would ordinarily be expected to try them
all in one judicial proceeding.....-' The doctrine is grounded in the
theory that claims that are closely related comprise but one constitu-
tional "case." 68 Its justification lies "in considerations of judicial econ-
omy, convenience and fairness to litigants."69
Pendent jurisdiction has apparently never been explicitly extended
to criminal cases. Nonetheless, much the same rationale would seem
to apply. Article III "cases" clearly include criminal prosecutions.-3
Furthermore, as Justice Brennan, the author of the Gibbs opinion, has
noted, "[the considerations of justice, economy, and convenience that
have propelled the movement for consolidation of civil cases apply with
even greater force in the criminal context," particularly in light of the
traditional principle that a defendant should not be subjected to mul-
tiple trials for the same act.7 1 In addition to avoiding the expense and
injustice of multiple prosecutions, a single trial would minimize the
loss of liberty imposed by pre-trial detention and avoid inconsistent
sentencing and treatment decisions.
72
Piggyback jurisdiction, however, goes beyond the notion of pendent
jurisdiction generally applied in civil litigation, in that the appended
offense is a federal crime, governed by federal law, rather than simply
a state offense tried at the same time.73 It might be argued that the
proposed piggyback jurisdiction thus exceeds the constitutional limits
on congressional authority indicated in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.J4 In




70. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 264, 268 (1879).
71. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 456 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). Ashe itself
involved only a determination of the scope to be afforded the double jeopard), rule as
applied to repeated state prosecutions. However, Justice Brennan explicitly noted the
parallel between that issue and the rule of pendent jurisdiction enunciated in Gibbs. Id.
at 454, 456.
Although the double jeopardy clause has been held inapplicable to dual state and
federal prosecutions, see note 141 infra, the Code contains statutory prohibitions against
such re-prosecutions, see pp. 1235-37 infra.
72. One particularly unfortunate result of dual state and federal prosecutions is the
detainer system, under which a federal prisoner is generally denied parole if the state
notifies federal authorities that it intends to prosecute after the prisoner has served his
federal sentence. See Schwartz, supra note 18. at 71.
73. In this respect R.S. 5509, pp. 1214-16 supra, is closer to the concept of pendent
jurisdiction applied in civil litigation than is the Code's pigg)'back provision.
Similarly, in those criminal prosecutions removed to federal court, 28 U..C. §§ 1442(a),
1442a, 1443 (1970), see note 65 supra, state, rather than federal, substantive law is applied
in the federal trial. See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879); FED. R. OusI. P., Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 54(b)(1).
74. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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troversial passage, 75 that Congress could not constitutionally prescribe
rules of substantive law to be applied in diversity cases.7 0 That prin-
ciple might be said to extend to any case where a matter normally with-
in the exclusive jurisdiction of the states is tried in federal court solely
for purposes of procedural convenience.77
Whatever the status of Erie's constitutional doctrine with respect to
diversity law, it need not be considered controlling as to piggyback
jurisdiction in criminal cases. First, unlike diversity cases, federal
prosecutions involving piggybacked offenses will always include an
underlying offense that will be tried according to federal law. To apply
state law to a piggybacked offense at the same trial would be cumber-
some and confusing, requiring the jury to apply two different and pos-
sibly conflicting standards to the same conduct.7 3 Second, in the vast
majority of cases, federal jurisdiction over the piggybacked offense
itself will also be justifiable in terms of a substantive means-ends
analysis as described above, and in those cases the power to apply federal
law is clear. There will, of course, be some cases in which a procedural
justification alone exists for piggybacking.70 But disallowing the ap-
plication of federal law in those few cases would lead to a complex,
time-consuming dispute as to whether a case came within the excep-
tion, and thus might undercut congressional efforts to apply federal
law to protect federal interests. Finally, the problem of forum-shop-
ping, while not entirely absent,8 0 is far less significant with respect to
75. The constitutional discussion in Erie has been the subject of extensive commen.
tary. References are collected in C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 230-31 (1970).
76. 304 U.S. at 78. Of course, the Erie doctrine raises no question as to the power of
Congress to prescribe procedural rules for criminal cases in federal court, regardless of tile
basis for federal jurisdiction.
77. State law is generally applied to pendent claims in civil suits, Note, Problems of
Parallel State and Federal Remedies, 71 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1958), and it has been sug-
gested that, following Erie, this result may be constitutionally required, Comment, Pen-
dent Jurisdiction-Application of the Erie Doctrine, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 543, 552 (1957). It
is by no means clear, however, that the Erie rule extends this far, D'Oench, Duhme & C.
v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 465 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring), and, at least when the pendent
claim involves issues of unfair competition, there is some authority for the application
of federal law. Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzburg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1917); Zlinkoff,
Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trade.Marks and Unfair Competition, 42
COLUM. L. REV. 955 (1942); Note, 60 HARV. L. REV. 821 (1947). Cf. Taussig v. Wellington
Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1970).
78. The same argument has been made with respect to pendent civil claims, Zlukoff,
supra note 77, at 988-90; Note, 60 HARV. L. REV. 821 (1947), although, as indicated II
note 77 supra, the general practice has been to apply state law.
79. Arguably such a case would arise if an offender were to set off several bombs at
the same time in several different buildings, one of which was a federal courthouse while
the others had no connection with the federal government. It might be difficult to argue
that the bombing of the federal building stood in a means-end relation to the other
bombings, yet a single trial for the whole episode would clearly be procedurally coni.
venient.
80. In strict terms, of course, the type of forum shopping available in diversity cases
is impossible in criminal prosecutions, since both state and federal prosecutors are limited
to using the courts established by their respective governments. Nonetheless, It seems
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piggybacking in criminal cases than it is in diversity cases, where it
provides substantial justification for the application of state law. Put
briefly, the application of federal law to piggybacked offenses is "neces-
sary and proper"sl to the exercise of federal power to try the entirety
of an Article III "case." 82
The appropriate scope of a single "transaction" from the procedural
perspective has not been carefully defined. Gibbs speaks of "a common
nucleus of operative fact,"8 3 but it is not clear how much of a factual
overlap is required.8 4 The interests of convenience and judicial econ-
omy supporting the procedural argument suggest that federal authority
should extend to all offenses which, were they prosecuted by one au-
thority, could be joined in a single trial. Modern rules of joinder, such
as Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,83 though not
definitive explications of the constitutional limits, are useful guide-
lines since they were written with precisely those interests in mind and
have already been subject to judicial interpretation. 0 Indeed the Court
in Gibbs referred to the liberal joinder provisions in the Federal Rules
plausible that, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, either a state or federal prosecutor
might defer to, or even encourage, prosecution in the other forum because of %ariations
in the law to be applied-for example, because the available penalty in tile prosecutor's
own jurisdiction seems either too lenient or too harsh. However, if appropriate restraints
on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion are implemented, as discussed at pp. 1232-34
infra, the choice of a federal or state court should seldom if ever be made simply be-
cause the law to be applied will be less favorable to the defendant.
81. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965); Ely. Legislative and Administra.
tive Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205. 1305-06 nn. 300, 301 (1970).
82. The application of federal law to piggybacked offenses might also be challenged
as a violation of the equal protection element in Fifth Amendment due process. Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), when federal substantive law is harsher than state law-
for example, if the death penalty is retained, despite the Commission's contrary recom-
mendation, CoDE Chapter 36, Introductory Comment, and the dubious constitutional
status of such punishment after the Supreme Court's recent decision in Furman v.
Georgia, 40 US.LAV. 4923 (U.S. June 29, 1972). This claim would probably fail under
the traditional equal protection test, Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs,
330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947), because the federal government cannot be said to have made
an arbitrary classification of offenders-Congress has chosen to subject to federal law only
those already accused of having committed federal crimes. However, at least when the
defendant's life is at stake, the courts are likely to apply the "fundamental interest"
analysis which requires a compelling state interest to uphold tle classification. Cf. Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535.
541 (1942). In those cases in which there is a substantive federal interest in prosecuting
for the piggybacked offense, it seems probable that courts would find a compelling state
interest. An equal protection challenge could, however, raise much more substantial dif-
ficulties in those few cases in which the only justification for federal prosecution of the
piggybacked offense is procedural, see note 79 supra.
83. 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
84. See Note, UMTV v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. REV. 657, 659.62
(1968).
85. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that two or more
offenses may be joined if they "are of the same or similar character or are based on the
same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan."
86. Cf. I C. WRIGn, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 143 (1969); Ashe v. Swenson,
397 U.S. 436, 454 n.8 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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of Civil Procedure, analogous to those in the Criminal Rules, as a clear
expression of the philosophy underlying its opinion."7 At the same
time, the defendant's interest in avoiding multiple prosecution argues
for including within a single transaction all offenses for which subse-
quent prosecution by the same authority would be barred by the
double jeopardy clause. The latter standard has, however, generally
been more narrowly construed than the joinder standard.88 Since a
broader standard would fully protect the defendant's interest in avoid-
ing multiple prosecutions, and convenience and economy are consti-
tutionally cognizable interests, the joinder definition of a single trans-
action would seem the proper rule.
The foregoing discussion indicates that most conceivable applica-
tions of piggyback jurisdiction would be constitutional under either a
substantive or procedural theory of federal jurisdiction. Yet some
crimes, though committed close enough in time or place to a federal
offense to come arguably within the language of the piggyback pro-
vision, might not meet either of the transaction tests-that is, either be
part of a criminal transaction affecting a federal interest or have factual
questions in common with the federal offense. This situation is par-
ticularly likely to occur in connection with crimes that continue over
an extended period of time, such as possession offenses, conspiracies,
and illegal businesses like gambling.8 9 A teenager in possession of mari-
juana, for example, might engage in shoplifting. Under the Code, he
would be subject to federal prosecution for possession of a dangerous
or abusable drug.90 Federal prosecution might then be possible for the
shoplifting offense as well, since it was arguably committed "in the
course of committing" the drug offense. Yet it would be difficult to
argue that either offense was a means of committing the other, and
probably the only common factual element would be the defendant's
identity.91 Federal prosecution of a piggybacked offense in such a case
87. 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).
88. It seems that no uniform test regarding the scope of the double jeopardy rule has
yet developed. Various courts have applied "same evidence," "same offense," and "same
act" tests, as well as the seemingly broader "same transaction" test. See J. SIGLtEa, DoUiBtL
JEoPARDY 63-69 (1969); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 450-58 (1970) (Brennan, J., con.
curring).
89. See p. 1228 infra.
90. CODE § 1824.
91. There may be cases not far removed from this example in which the federal inter-
est is more plausible. For example, suppose that a man were caught robbing a local stoic
while in possession of heroin. It could well be that the robbery was simply a means by
which the offender supported his habit, or, differently stated, that it was done with
intent to use the proceeds to procure more heroin. Certainly the relationship between
the two offenses would appear to be as close as that which the Court relied upon In
Perez, discussed at p. 1219 supra. On the other hand, one might still be hesitant to
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might, therefore, exceed constitutional bounds. A court faced with this
situation could construe the piggyback provision to avoid the constitu-
tional question by incorporating the appropriate substantive and pro-
cedural definitions of a criminal transaction.02
III. The Scope of Piggback Jurisdiction
As the preceding discussion indicates, the basic rationale for piggy-
back jurisdiction is to insure federal jurisdiction over the entirety of
a criminal transaction when jurisdiction extends to any part of it.93
Whenever an offense stands in a means-end relation to or has factual
elements in common with an offense as to which there is an interest in
federal prosecution, there will necessarily be a federal interest in pros-
ecuting the former offense as well. Piggyback jurisdiction is thus essen-
tially a procedural device giving federal authorities the power to
prosecute an entire criminal transaction when federal prosecution is
construe the language of the piggyback provision to cover such a situation. See note 49
supra and p. 1231 infra.
Of course, if the heroin that the offender had in his possession was the thing stolen,
there would be no question about the appropriateness of a piMbacked robbery charge.
92. Some support for such an interpretation can be found in the Commission's coin.
mentary on the piggyback provision, which notes that " 'In the course of committing'...
requires more than a mere temporal connection between the two offenses." CoDE § 201,
Comment.
93. The Commission justifies piggyback jurisdiction primarily as a means of dealing
with the problem of "grading," that is, of designing the Code so that the sentencing
structure is appropriately coordinated with the severity of the offense involved-a problem
that has proved particularly troublesome under present law. See CODE § 201, Comment;
McClellan, supra note 1, at 696-97. For example, impersonation of a lederal official is
presently a felony punishable by tip to three years imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1970).
"treatment too severe for mere impersonation of a marshal in order to serve legal process,
but not severe enough for a kidnapping'or major fraud which might be committed by
impersonating a federal official." CODE § 201, Comment. The Code reduces the imper-
sonation offense to a misdemeanor, CODE § 1381, and relies on the piggback provision
to insure appropriate punishment for the related offense.
The Commission notes that piggyback jurisdiction should prosc particularly useful in
prosecuting civil rights offenses and crinues against federal witnesses and infornants. See
Brown & Schwartz, New Federal Crminal Code is Submitted; 56 A.BA\.J. 8,14. 817 (1970)
(an article by the Commission's Chairman and Staff Director introducing the proposed
Code). Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) (deprivation of rights under color of law) now pro-
vides for a maximum sentence of one year in all cases except "if death results." in which
case life imprisonment can be imposed. See p. 1214 supra and pp. 1239-40 inlra.
Under the Code, the basic offense remains a misdemeanor with a Manlxnnmum penalty of
one year, CODE § 1502, but can be accompanied by a piggybacked charge for the condtct
causing the deprivation-whether murder, assault, arson, or kidnapping. Similarly. inter-
fering with a federal witness or informant is presently punishable by a maximtm sen-
tence of five years, even if the means of interference is murder, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1510
(1970), but under the Code can lead to a higher range of sentences when pigg)backed
offenses are involved.
The description of piggyback jurisdiction as a "grading" device tends to focus atten-
tion on the problem of determining the appropriate sentence for a given course of con-
duct, rather than on the antecedent issue of determining what elements of the defendant's
conduct are to be federally punished-that is, the jurisdictional question. It is the latter,
more fundamental issue which is the primary focus of the present discussion.
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warranted at all.94 The scope of piggyback jurisdiction is therefore
dependent not only on the range of offenses that may be piggybacked,
but also on the breadth of the underlying federal jurisdiction. It should
be noted that piggybacking would not extend federal jurisdiction to
persons not otherwise subject to federal prosecution. While the pro-
vision extends federal authority to certain acts presently beyond its
reach, the primary determinant of the scope of federal jurisdiction-
and the most appropriate focus for federalist concerns-is still the juris-
diction provided for underlying offenses.
Given that the purpose of the piggyback provision is to encompass
all elements of a criminal transaction for which federal prosecution is
appropriate, it would seem that any offense should be eligible for
piggybacking onto any other federal offense. There should be no arbi-
trary limits on the prosecutor's ability to charge for the entirety of the
transaction. Such an approach would be consistent with the basic phi-
losophy, underlying the Code's other jurisdictional reforms, of defining
federal jurisdiction broadly enough to include all major classes of cases
for which federal enforcement might be justified, and relying on con-
trol of prosecutorial discretion to prevent inappropriate uses of that
power.00
94. The question of when federal prosecution is warranted is, of course, exceedingly
complex. Common justifications for federal enforcement are that the offense affects tile
operations of the national government, that state authorities are unable to prosecute effec.
tively because of interstate complications or resource limitations, or that state authorities
will not prosecute in good faith because of local corruption or racial prejudice. For fur-
ther discussion of these issues, see Schwartz, supra note 18; Abrams, supra note 18. Of
course, in determining the appropriate scope to be afforded amy justification for fedetal
enforcement, it is necessary to consider the countervailing interests generally favoring state
law enforcement: the increased potential for diversity and experimentation in handling
problems of criminal justice, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171-93 (1968) (Harlan,
J., dissenting), and protection from the dangers of centralized authority, see R. JACKSON,
THE SUtPREME CouRT IN ThlE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENr 70-71 (1955). The Coin-
mission has tried to come to grips with these issues directly in § 207, which contains
guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See note 28 supra and pp. 1232.
34 infra. Extended analysis of these issues is not necessary for present purposes since tile
transaction rationale for piggybacking will apply whatever justifications for federal pros.
ecution are employed.
95. There appear to be only two possible exceptions. First, there could be I case In
which an individual was an accomplice to a piggybacked offense but not to the underly.
ing offense. For example, an individual might assist a bank robber in stealing a car to
secure the robber's escape, yet not be aware of the bank robbery itself, and hence would
be an accomplice to a crime committed "in immediate flight from" the robbery, but not
to the robbery. Such cases will obviously be rare.
Second, it might be argued that the piggyback provision would cover a crime committed
by a bystander or victim of a federal crime. To take a somewhat strained example, at
debtor might unjustifiably assault an agent of his creditor who impersonates I federal
marshal in serving legal process. Yet, while prosecution for the assault might require
proof of some of the same facts as the impersonation offense itself, it seems an inappro.
priate-and ungrammatical-interpretation of the piggyback provision to say that the
assault was "committed in the course of committing" the impersonation.
96. See p. 1213 supra and pp. 1232-34 infra.
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The Commission's original Study Draft07 did in fact provide piggy-
back jurisdiction for nearly all offenses to which it could be applied.
The Final Report, 98 however, restricts piggyback jurisdiction by limit-
ing both the offenses that employ the piggyback provision as a jurisdic-
tional base and the offenses available as underlying offenses. Given the
inconsistency of any such limitations with both the logic of piggyback-
ing and the Commission's general jurisdictional approach, the Final
Report's changes call for careful examination.
A. Limitations on Piggybacked Offenses
As noted earlier,99 the Final Report limits piggyback jurisdiction to
those common crimes against persons and property contained in Chap-
ters 16 and 17 of the Code. The only exception is the extension of the
piggyback base to four other offenses concerning corruption and intimi-
dation of local officials. 100 In terms of the Code as a whole, this is not
a major jurisdictional restriction; most of the other chapters of the
Code contain offenses, such as those involving national security, gov-
ernment operations, internal revenue, and civil rights, as to which
federal jurisdiction is plenary.
One other chapter, however, contains offenses that are not normally
within the federal jurisdiction. This is Chapter 18, entitled "Offenses
Against Public Order, Health, Safety, and Sensibilities," which covers
riot, trafficking in firearms, gambling, obscenity, and drug offenses.
In the Study Draft, piggyback jurisdiction was provided for the more
serious of these offenses, including inciting riot,101 supplying or re-
ceiving illicit firearms, 102 gambling in violation of local law, 03 and
promoting prostitution.104 In the Final Report, on the other hamd,
none of the Chapter 18 offenses were given piggyback jurisdiction.
There are two possible justifications for this restriction. First, it is
unlikely that such offenses would often be so closely related to an un-
derlying offense as to form part of the same transaction. Clearly, how-
ever, there could well be situations in which piggyback jurisdiction
over these offenses would be useful and justifiable. For example, a local
97. See note 3 supra.
98. See note 3 supra.
99. See p. 1214 supra.
100. CODE §§ 1361 (Bribery), 1362 (Unlawful Rewarding of Public Servants), 1366
(Threatening Public Servants), and 1367 (Retaliation).
101. STUDY DRAFT (and CODE) § 1801.
102. Id. §§ 1811, 1812, 1813. The definitions of these offenses in the Code differ some-
what from those in the Study Draft. See note 119 infra.
103. Id. § 1831.
104. Id. § 1841.
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gambling operation could be maintained in close connection with an
illicit drug business, or an individual could incite a riot in the course
of destroying government property or interfering with interstate trans-
portation facilities. Since the gambling operation might be the means
of financing the drug business, or a nucleus of facts common to both
the riot and property destruction offenses might exist, there could well
be a federal interest in prosecuting the entire transaction that would
be frustrated by denying piggyback jurisdiction to Chapter 18 offenses.
Second, piggyback jurisdiction may have been withdrawn out of
concern that the on-going nature of several Chapter 18 offenses might
result in inappropriate applications of piggybacking. There is, of
course, opportunity for abuse. An individual who operates an illegal
gambling business might, at some time during the protracted period
of its operation, commit another unrelated federal crime and then be
charged in federal court with a piggybacked gambling offense as well,
since it could arguably be said to have been committed "in the course
of committino" the federal offense. Yet this eventuality, which also
presents itself as a consequence of possession offenses,10 5 can be re-
solved by judicial interpretation of the piggyback provision" and con-
trols on prosecutorial discretion. It seems unnecessary, and inconsistent
with the Code's general outlook, to contract jurisdiction in response to
this danger.
B. Limitations on Underlying Offenses
Similar conclusions follow from an examination of the proposed
limitations on underlying offenses. In the Study Draft, piggybacked of-
fenses could have been prosecuted when associated with "any other
offense over which federal jurisdiction exists,"1 07 rather than "any
other offense defined in this Code over which federal jurisdiction ex-
ists," as provided in the Final Report. 08 The change is significant.
There are a large number of federal offenses, most of them regulatory,
defined not in the Criminal Code but in other titles of the United
States Code. Typical are provisions prohibiting unfair trade practices,
safety equipment violations, and improper labeling of food and
drugs. 1° 9 The elimination of such regulatory offenses as underlying
105. See p. 1224 supra.
106. See p. 1225 supra.
107. STUDY DRAFT § 201(b).
108. CODE § 201(b) (emphasis added).
109. A table of current regulatory statutes with criminal penalties is included as an
appendix to Schwartz & Markowitz, Comment on Regulatory Offenses, 1 WoRKING PAPERS
403, 410-17.
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offenses for piggybacking is another reflection of the generally more
restrictive approach to jurisdiction taken in the Final Report. Again,
however, the Study Draft's position seems more consistent with the
rationale for piggyback jurisdiction and with the general reliance on
limiting discretion rather than jurisdiction.
In the first place, the expansion of federal jurisdiction that would
result from allowing common crimes to be piggybacked onto regulatory
offenses would probably be slight. It is unlikely that many crimes of
the type included in Chapters 16 and 17 could ever be said to have
been committed "in the course of committing"-much less "in imme-
diate flight from the commission of"-regulatory violations. On the
other hand, there might be considerable justification for federal
prosecution of those offenses that actually occur in connection with
regulatory offenses such as piggybacked offenses closely related to
violations of health and safety standards or fraudulent business prac-
tices provisions. Thus, a piggybacked charge of negligent homicide for
the deaths resulting from the improper labeling of a dangerous drug 10
or a piggybacked charge of theft for a violation of a consumer credit
disclosure requirement 111 might be justified, both because the regu-
lations were designed to provide protection against precisely those con-
sequences and because of the substantial overlap of factual proof re-
quired for both offenses.
The Final Report moves part way toward meeting this problem by
including in Chapter 16 a special offense of "reckless endangerment"
that prohibits creation of "a substantial risk of serious bodily injury
or death to another."" 2 The offense carries a one year maximum sen-
tence unless "the circumstances manifest . . extreme indifference to
the value of human life," in which case the maximum is seven years.' 13
A unique jurisdictional provision allows it to be piggybacked onto any
other federal offense, whether or not contained in the Criminal
Code." 4 The reckless endangerment offense is particularly appropriate
for piggybacking onto regulatory offenses designed to protect health
and safety, and for this reason the special piggyback jurisdiction pro-
vided is dearly justified.
110. Under present law, such a regulatory violation could be punished by a maximunt
sentence of three years, even if intent to mislead were shown. 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1970). CoDE§ 3006 would limit the maximum sentence for any offense outside the Code to one year.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1970) provides for a maximum sentence of one year for viola.
tion of provisions in the Truth in Lending Act, id. q§ 1601 el seq.
112. CoDE § 1613. The provision essentially follows MODEL PENAL ConE § 211.2 (Pro-
posed Final Draft, 1962).
113. CODE § 1613.
114. The language used is the same as that employed in § 201(b) as it appeared in the
Study Draft. See p. 1228 supra.
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Yet it is not clear why only this offense, among all those listed in
Chapters 16 and 17, should be amenable to piggybacking onto offenses
outside the Code. As noted above, for example, a sufficiently serious
violation of drug labeling regulations might warrant a negligent homi-
cide charge as well. Moreover, it would seem that piggyback jurisdic-
tion for such a charge might be obtained even as the Code is presently
written, since nothing appears to prevent a prosecutor from piggyback-
ing reckless endangerment onto the regulatory violation, and then
piggybacking negligent homicide, or another appropriate offense, onto
the charge of reckless endangerment. The Code contains no explicit
bar to such double piggybacking and, as suggested above, it might be
appropriate in certain circumstances.'n 5
Admittedly, extension of piggyback jurisdiction to include regula.
tory violations as underlying offenses would create some opportunity
for abuse. The ongoing nature of some regulatory offenses-such as
licensing or reporting violations-raises the possibility that other, unre-
lated criminal activity may occur during the extended course of that
violation and thus arguably fall within the language of the piggyback
provision. Again, however, legislative and judicial limitations on the
use of discretion would seem an adequate safeguard, and would avoid
an arbitrary limitation on prosecutorial power." 6
Given the generally broad definition of piggyback jurisdiction and
the Code's general reliance on prosecutorial discretion, it is difficult
to discern a persuasive reason for the Final Report's retreat from the
Study Draft's approach to piggybacking; perhaps the changes were un-
dertaken simply to increase the political acceptability of the Code.111
115. It may be that the Commission did not intend to provide an opportunitly for
such double piggybacking. If so, and if the more restrictive language of the piggybatck
provision in the Final Report reflects a strong-and heretofore unarticulated-polcy, coll-
trary to that suggested in the text, against permitting crimes other than reckless endanger-
ment to be piggybacked onto regulatory offenses, then an explicit prohibition against
double piggybacking should be included either in the reckless endangerment provision
or in the piggyback provision itself.
116. In this connection, it should be noted that an aggressive federal prosecutor might
try piggybacking any of a host of common crimes onto the Code's tax evasion provisions,
CODE §§ 1401, 1402. If taken far enough, this approach could result in federal jurisdiction
over virtually any crime which resulted in an unreported gain to the offender. (Indeed,
it has been argued that practice under the existing statutes already approaches too close
to this result. Cf. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).) Such
an application of piggybacking, however, while not beyond the range of a liberal inter.
pretation of the means-end test proposed, pp. 1218.20 supra, would clearly require stretch.
ing the meaning of the phrase "in the course of committing" unreasonably, and most
likely would not survive judicial scrutiny.
117. The Study Draft provoked some harsh criticism. See Liebmann, supra note 6,
National Association of Attorneys General, supra note 6.
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A similar concern may explain the refusal, in both versions, to make
certain crimes in the Code itself underlying offenses for purposes of
piggybacking. Most notable are the three provisions that prohibit sup-
plying or receiving firearms when the recipient intends to commit a
crime with the firearm or is a member of a specially defined class of
ineligible recipients, or when the firearm itself is of a particular char-
acter.1 18 Clearly, some offenses could be committed in connection with
a firearms transaction and thus be appropriate subjects for piggyback-
ing. For example, an offender might shoot a police officer attempting
to prevent receipt of an interstate firearms shipment. Yet the extension
of piggyback jurisdiction to these offenses would not lead to jurisdic-
tion over all crimes subsequently committed with the firearm. Al-
though receipt of the firearm may be the means of committing a sub-
sequent robbery, the latter offense can hardly be said to have been
"committed in the course of committing or in immediate flight from"
the firearms purchase, within the ordinary meaning of those words.110
The inconsistency of the firearms exclusion with both the rationale of
piggybacking and the Code's general jurisdictional approach is sharply
revealed by the fact that the Commission permits piggybacking onto
one of the same supplying and receiving offenses when explosives rather
than firearms are involved.
12 0
118. CODE §§ 1811, 1812, 1813.
119. Thus here, as elsewhere, the ordinary meaning of the language of § 201(b) proves
narrower than the transaction tests proposed at pp. 1218.25 supra. See notes 49, 91, and
116 supra.
Note that the result here would be quite different if the Commission's recommendation
for the outlawing of handguns were adopted, CODE Comment preceding § 1811. If pos.
session of a handgun were a federal crime, and if the offense were available as an under-
lying offense for piggybacking, then virtually all crimes committed with handgms would
become federal offenses. Such a substantial expansion of federal jurisdiction might not be
necessary to effectuate the federal interest in gun control, and consequently there might
be good reason for excluding such a possession offense as an underl)ing offense for pur-
poses of piggybacking.
In the Study Draft, § 1811 extended to possessing as well .as supplying and receiving
firearms, and consequently there may have been more substantial justification for exclud-
ing this offense from the piggyback base there than in the Final Report.
120. CODE § 1811.
Both the Final Report and the Study Draft also exclude as an underlying offense the
fugitive felon offense, CODE § 1310, which makes it a federal crime to cross a state line in
order to avoid prosecution for a state felony, or to avoid giving evidence in a state pro.
ceeding. The purpose of the statute is to permit federal authorities to apprehend a sus-
pect and turn him over to state authorities for prosecution; it is virtually never used as
a basis for federal indictment. In fact, the Commission's consultant on jurisdiction recom-
mended that the fugitive felon offense be eliminated altogether in favor of a provision
simply giving the federal government authority to arrest state offenders who have fled
interstate. Abrams, Consultant's Report on a Fugitive Felon Offense, I MOKIlNG PAPrrU
551. Thus, the decision not to extend piggyback jurisdiction to this offense can be ration-
alized on the ground that, since the fugitive felon offense will never be prosecuted as a
federal offense at all, neither the means-end argument nor the convenience of a single
trial would justify piggyback jurisdiction.
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IV. Jurisdiction Versus Enforcement: The Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion
The desirability of giving greater scope to piggyback jurisdiction
than is provided by the Final Report is of course dependent to some
deoree on the effectiveness of the controls imposed on the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.
In the past, prosecutorial policy has been a matter internal to the
Justice Department, largely free from public influence or scrutiny.' -'
The resulting pattern of enforcement has been, at best, uneven. In
some cases, federal enforcement has almost entirely displaced state en-
forcement, for no apparent reason. Federal authorities, for example,
have assumed substantial responsibility for the investigation and pros-
ecution of bank robbery122 and interstate automobile theft'23 even
though the federal interest in prosecuting for such activity appears
relatively small.
On the other hand, there are examples of considerable restraint. For
instance, the Hobbs Act grants federal jurisdiction over any robbery
that "affects commerce,"'1 24 and could easily be construed to cover rob-
bery of almost any business. Nonetheless, prosecutions under the Act
have been infrequent.125
Section 207 of the proposed Code, which sets forth guidelines for
the exercise of prosecutorial restraint, represents an effort to introduce
some rationality and consistency into enforcement policies. The section
"authorizes" federal authorities to defer to state enforcement whenever
the offense can be effectively prosecuted by local authorities and no
substantial federal interest is involved. It describes a number of cir-
cumstances in which "a substantial federal interest" exists: where there
are interstate impediments to effective state prosecution; where federal
involvement is necessary to vindicate federal civil rights; where there
is an association with interstate organized crime; and where there is
corruption of local enforcement authorities. 120 With respect to piggy-
121. An informative inside view of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion at the fed-
eral level is presented in Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L.
REv. 174 (1965). Occasionally, Justice Department policy on the exercise of prosecutorlal
discretion has come to light in the context of a lawsuit. See Redmond v. United States,
384 U.S. 264 (1966); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 159-60 (1945).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970). State enforcement authorities have accused the FBI of
"hogging" bank robberies simply because they are big cases. Cf. Kaplan, supra note 121,
at 192.
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1970). As of 1970, this was the most frequently prosecuted fed.
eral offense. McClellan, supra note I, at 699.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
125. Stein, Comment on Robbery, 2 WORKING PAPERS 903, 910.
126. CODr § 207.
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backed offenses, it states that the necessary interest exists if "the offense
is closely related to the underlying offense, as to which there is a sub-
stantial federal interest."'127
The effectiveness of Section 207, however, is subject to question.
Its standards are so vague as to represent more an expression of attitude
than a workable set of criteria. Furthermore, the provision is advisory;
it merely "authorizes" federal prosecutors to decline prosecution in
certain circumstances, and is expressly made non-litigable. In order to
give the section more force, the Commission suggests, with what seems
unreasonable optimism, that Congress might use it in appropriations
hearings as a yardstick for assessing the employment of federal re-
sources.
128
Some effort might be made to strengthen the language of Section
207. For example, federal prosecutors could be "directed" rather than
"authorized" to decline prosecution whenever the established criteria
are not satisfied and the requirement that the piggybacked offense be
"closely related" to the underlying offense could be replaced with a
more explicit version of the transaction test outlined previously. " The
improvements that can be derived from such rephrasing are likely to
be limited, however, both because of the difficulties at the legislative
level of defining explicitly and comprehensively all of the factors rele-
vant to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and because of the lack
of sanctions for disregarding the criteria, however defined. 130
The Commission's consultant on jurisdiction has surveyed a num-
ber of alternative methods of controlling the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.' 3 ' For example, to increase the specificity of the guidelines,
the Attorney General could be required to issue public statements of
prosecutorial policy or to promulgate appropriate administrative regu-
lations. These approaches, however, would stillleave authority to de-
fine those policies solely in the hands of the Justice Department and
would introduce only the control derived from public exposure, unless
the rules were made subject to judicial review. To insure greater pro-
tection of state interests, various mechanisms for bringing state and
local authorities into the decision-making process could be em-
127. Id. Section 207 is quoted in full at note 28 supra.
128. CODE § 207, Comment. See Abrams, supra note 18, at 60.
129. See pp. 1218-25 supra.
130. The criteria set forth in § 207 are examined in some detail in Dobb)n, A Pro.
posal for Changing the Jurisdictional Provisions of the New Federal Criminal Code, 57
CORNELL L. REv. 198 (1972), and an altered version is proposed. The proposal, however,
can at best be considered a marginal improvement over the original.
131. Abrams, supra note 18, at 57-62.
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ployed.' 32 Thus, federal prosecutors could be required to consult with
local authorities before making a decision, to defer prosecution for a
set period to permit local prosecution, or to await a request from state
authorities for federal action.133
As the consultant's report suggests, 34 more explicit and detailed
formulation and public disclosure of federal enforcement policy ap-
pears desirable. Making matters of prosecutorial policy litigable or
formally involving non-federal authorities in the decision-making
process, however, would probably create more problems than such
devices would solve.' 35 It appears that the better policy would be to
defer judgment on such additional controls until there has been sub-
stantial experience with prosecutorial policy under the new Code.
Although direct state participation in federal decision-making may
not be desirable, state capacity to prosecute for an entire transaction
that involves a strictly federal crime, parallel to the federal power pro-
vided by the piggyback provision, might be helpful in dealing with
the problems of federalism inherent in concurrent jurisdiction. Section
201(b) insures that when a federal juror is assaulted, the federal gov-
ernment will be able to prosecute for both the intimidation of the
juror and the assault. States, however, can generally prosecute only for
the assault.13 6 If multiple prosecutions are to be avoided in such situa-
tions, the federal prosecutor will have to choose between, on the one
hand, prosecuting the entire transaction in federal court simply to in-
sure that the defendant will be charged for the uniquely federal offense,
even though the state is perfectly capable of prosecuting for the piggy-
backed offense, or, on the other hand, leaving the case to state authori-
ties and dropping the federal offense. The better solution, it would
seem, would be to give the state courts jurisdiction over the federal
offense, so that it could be prosecuted by state authorities along with
132. The discussion here has focused primarily on whether federal or state authorities
should handle particular cases. Yet concurrent jurisdiction also gives rise to the possibility
of conflicting state and federal policies as to whether certain types of crime are to be
prosecuted at all, and the nature and number of offenses with which given classes of
offenders who are being prosecuted are to be charged. Some mechanism for collaboration,
whether formal or informal, seems particularly appropriate to harmonize such policies.
133. See also Dobbyn, supra note 130, in which it is proposed that federal prosecutors
be required to obtain approval from a federal magistrate before prosecuting for common
crimes.
134. Abrams, supra note 18, at 58.
135. For example, if requests from local authorities were required, there would have
to be some mechanism whereby federal authorities could ignore that requirement t cases
involving a bad faith refusal to prosecute at the state level due to local corruption or
racial prejudice. And making prosecutorial policy litigable would obviously lead to sub-
stantial delays in criminal cases. For further difficulties see Abrams, supra note 18, at
59-62.
136. Intimidation of a juror, federal as well as state, may occasionally be a violation of
state law. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.2 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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the state offense. Section 3231 of Title 18 presently grants federal dis-
trict courts exclusive jurisdiction over federal crimes. 137 That provision
could be modified to give state courts jurisdiction either over all fed-
eral offenses, or, paralleling the piggyback provision, only over those
federal offenses committed in the course of committing state offenses.
There is precedent for giving the states jurisdiction over federal of-
fenses, 138 and the constitutionality of such action seems clear.130 Appro-
priate safeguards could be devised to prevent abuse.140 Such a provision
would permit greater deference to state enforcement, while insuring
both that federal interests are vindicated and that the defendant is
spared multiple prosecutions.
V. Piggyback Jurisdiction from the Defendant's Perspective
Although the primary focus of debate on piggyback jurisdiction is
the conflict between state and federal authority, its impact on criminal
defendants must also be examined.
A. Double Jeopardy
From the defendant's point of view, the argument that piggyback
jurisdiction promotes convenience and fairness by affording a single
trial for the entirety of a transaction would lose its appeal if the fed-
eral trial did not act as a bar to subsequent state prosecution for all or
part of the same transaction.' 4 ' The authors of the Code have dealt
with this problem directly by including a provision that bars state pros-
ecution in cases where a prior federal prosecution was "based on the
same conduct or arose from the same criminal episode," unless the
137. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1970).
138. Congress gave the states jurisdiction over certain federal crimes as early as 1794.
The history of such provisions is examined in detail in Warren, Federal Criminal Laws
and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REv. 545 (1925). See also Testa v. Katt, 330 US. 386,
389-90 (1947).
139. In Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). it was held that state courts could be not
only authorized but compelled to entertain federal penal litigation. See Note, Utili:ation
of State Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Development in Judicial
Federalism, 60 HARv. L. REv. 966 (1947).
140. For example, a simple procedure could be established whereby federal authorities
could preempt state prosecution, or, as a more substantial check, state authorities could
be required to obtain approval before prosecuting for federal offenses.
141. Dual state and federal prosecutions were held constitutional in Abbate v. United
States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (federal prosecution subsequent to state prosecution) and Bart-
kus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (state prosecution subsequent to federal prosecution).
The continuing validity of these decisions has been thrown in considerable doubt, how-
ever, by the subsequent decisions in Benton v. Maryland, 395 US. 784 (1969), which held
the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, and in Murphy v. Waterfront omm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), which
overturned the "dual sovereignty" principle as applied to the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.
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statute underlying the previous prosecution was "intended to prevent
a substantially different harm or evil" from the law defining the state
offense.' 42 A similar provision bars subsequent federal prosecution
when a state has already prosecuted, unless the Attorney General "cer-
tifies that the interests of the United States would be unduly harmed
if the federal prosecution is barred."'143
Piggyback jurisdiction complements this policy in two ways. First,
by permitting federal prosecution for the entirety of a given transac-
tion, it obviates the need for subsequent state prosecution. Second, it
eliminates the difficulties that might otherwise arise because of the
exception for subsequent state prosecution under statutes directed at
a "substantially different harm or evil." If, for example, an individual
impersonates a federal official in order to commit a theft, he could be
prosecuted under existing federal law only for the impersonation of-
fense,144 although he might be given a sentence close to the statutory
three-year maximum because of the accompanying theft. A subsequent
state prosecution for theft would probably be upheld, even under a
double jeopardy provision like that proposed in the Code, on the
ground that the state statute was directed at a different evil. Under the
Code, however, the entire transaction could be handled at the federal
142. CODE § 708. Such a bar to subsequent prosecution appears to be well within the
constitutional authority of Congress. Although the issue will not be treated here in depth,
several lines of reasoning which lead to this conclusion can be suggested.
First, such a bar could be considered necessary to protect federal judgment. in crininal
cases; subsequent state trial and punishment might well frustrate the verdict or sentence
decreed by the federal court. The authority of Congress to take analogous measures with
respect to civil litigation appears unquestioned. See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
314 U.S. 118, 132-34 (1941); 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970); IA J. MookE, FEoRAL PRcrlc. f J
0.208[3.-2]-[3.-3] (2d ed. 1965).
Second, it has been held that Congress can preempt a field if enforcement of state crimil
nal laws is likely to interfere with a scheme of national regulation. Pennsylvania v. Nel.
son, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
Third, it has been held that Congress has the power to remove to federal court certain
state criminal prosecutions which involve federal officers or interfere with federally-pro.
tected civil rights, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442(a), 1442a, 1443 (1970); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U,S.
257 (1879), indicating that Congress can deprive the states of jurisdiction over criminal
cases that affect a federal interest.
Fourth, there is a strong parallel in the well-established authority of Congress to pro-
hibit state prosecution for any criminal transaction as to which a defendant -las been re.
quired to give testimony in a federal proceeding. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,
434-36 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 606-08 (1896).
Fifth, Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), suggests that Congress might have tie
authority, under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to apply a somewhat stronger stand-
ard of double jeopardy to the states than is required by judicial interpretations of the
Amendment. See Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights,
80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 108 (1966). But see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
And finally, as suggested in note 141 supra, Bartkus may no longer be Footl authority
and thus such a bar would be required by the Constitution itself, even in the absence
of an act of Congress.
143. CODE § 707. That exception might be subject to constitutional challenge in the
light of Benton and Murphy. See note 141 supra.
144. 18 U.S.C. § 912 (1970).
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level with a separate charge of theft piggybacked onto the impersona-
tion offense, which carries only a one-year sentence in the Code.14
There could then be no doubt that a subsequent state prosecution for
theft would be redundant-and hence prohibited.
Given the defendant's substantial interest in a single trial and the
danger of inconsistent decisions by federal and state prosecutors, a sub-
sequent state prosecution for part of a single criminal transaction
should be permitted only where the defendant could not have been
charged with an analogous offense at the federal trial, regardless of
whether such a charge was actually brought. Thus, if the defendant
in the example above were tried in federal court for impersonation
but not for theft, a subsequent state prosecution for theft should be
barred anyway because a piggybacked charge of theft could have been
brought in the original trial. The Code already establishes such a rule
as to multiple federal prosecutions.140 The language of Section 708,
however, presently bars a subsequent state prosecution only in cases
where the defendant was actually tried1 41 for the corresponding federal
offense. Of course the change suggested would occasionally induce a
federal prosecutor to prosecute for a piggy backed offense in a case
where he might otherwise have deferred to state enforcement, and
hence could run counter to the interests of federalism. In such cases,
however, considerations of fairness to the defendant would seem to
outweigh the rather minor incursion on state enforcement that would
result.
B. Consequences of Terminating the Underlying Charge
A related issue is the disposition of a piggybacked offense when the
underlying offense is terminated either by dismissal or judgment for
the defendant. In such cases, the federal court should have authority
to retain jurisdiction over the piggy backed offense, absent a finding
that the charge for the underlying offense was clearly frivolous and was
made simply for the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction over the
underlying offense. 48 Such has been the rule with respect to pendent
145. CODE § 1381. See note 93 supra.
146. CODE § 703.
147. More specifically, the double jeopardy bar applies if the defendant was convicted
or acquitted, or judgment was for the defendant on a point of fact or law that would
prevent conviction, or, with some exceptions, when the case was tenninated without the
defendant's consent after the jury was impanelled. CODE §§ 708 and 704.
148. The only other necessary exception to this suggested rule is for cases in which.
the underlying offense is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In that case, tinder the terms
of the piggyback provision, there would be no jurisdiction over the pigg)backd offense
either, which would then also have to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. FED. R. ClUm.
P. 12(b)(2). Such a dismissal is not a bar to subsequent state prosecution. CODE § 709.
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jurisdiction in civil litigation,149 and there is no reason for a different
result with respect to piggybacking.
The reasons for adopting this approach, rather than the alternative
of requiring dismissal of the piggybacked offense whenever the under-
lying charge is terminated, are the same considerations of convenience
and fairness that support piggyback jurisdiction itself.'" ° At least when
a case has advanced well beyofnd the pleadings, a dismissal of the piggy-
backed charges and a subsequent retrial in state court would be likely
to involve substantial delay and duplication of effort. In such situa-
tions, the judge should exercise his discretion as to the dismissal of tile
piggybacked offense, with due regard for the interests of each of the
parties involved. In particular, he should consider the stage at which
the underlying offense is dismissed, whether the state statute covering
the piggybacked offense is significantly different from the federal stat-
ute, and the original reason for federal prosecution.15'
C. Plea Bargaining
The increased flexibility that piggyback jurisdiction would give fed-
eral prosecutors in framing indictments would increase significantly the
opportunities for plea bargaining. As a result, the familiar questions
concerning the fairness of that practice would become all the more
acute.' 5 2
However severe the objections to plea bargaining, they do not war-
rant rejection of piggyback jurisdiction. Even from the defendant's per-
spective, there would be little to gain from such a response. Any other
equally flexible system of defining aggravating offenses would also pro-
vide substantial room for bargaining. On the other hand, a less flexible
system, such as the present one, would in some cases provide for arbi-
trarily high sentences and in others, where the federal penalty seemed
149. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); A.H. Emery Co.
v. Marcan Products Corp., 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968).
150. See pp. 1220-21 supra.
151. For example, if the trial has already progressed to an advanced stage, the federal
statute covering the piggybacked offense is nearly identical to the state statute in deflni-
tion, defenses, and penalty, and the reason for federal prosecution was a breakdown in
local law enforcement due to corruption, there would seem to be no reason to relinquish
jurisdiction.
It is assumed here that the defendant has consented to or requested the dismissal of
the piggybacked offense. The government, of course, has the authority to dismiss stch a
charge whenever it wishes to do so, though if the trial has begun and the defendant's
consent is not obtained, the dismissal should act as a bar to a subsequent trial for the
piggybacked offense under the same circumstances as provided in the Code for the dis.
missal of any other federal offense. See CODE §§ 704(d), 705(a), 707(a), 708(a).
152. See generally Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HAn'V. L. REV,
1387 (1970); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUsTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTs 9-14 (1967).
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too low, would probably result in transferring the defendant to state
authorities for prosecution of all or part of the crime. In the latter
case the defendant would be faced with plea bargaining in the state
courts, not to mention the possibility of dual state and federal prosecu-
tion.1. 3 The enactment of the new Code would, nevertheless, be an
appropriate occasion for considering some of the current proposals for
plea bargaining reform. 54
D. Cumulative Sentencing
The increased variety of charges that piggybacking makes available
also increases the possibility that an individual might be convicted and
given cumulative sentences for a number of offenses based on the same
conduct, so that the punishment administered in certain cases could
be unduly harsh. The Code deals with this problem directly through
a provision specifically limiting the situations in which cumulative
sentences may be imposed. Section 3204 provides that consecutive sen-
tences may not be imposed where one offense is included in another
or consists only of preparation for or facilitation of the other (such as
conspiracy or attempt), or where one offense simply prohibits a spe-
cific instance of conduct prohibited generally by the other. Further-
more, the total sentence that may be imposed is generally limited to
the maximum penalty carried by the most serious offense involved,
with an exception as to sentencing for two or more offenses of roughly
equal seriousness where each "was committed as part of a different
course of conduct, or each involved a substantially different criminal
objective."'155 These provisions are clearly valuable additions to the
existing law.
E. Precision in Drafting
A final consideration is the specificity of the charges with which a
defendant is faced. Previous efforts at adjusting penalties for federal
offenses according to the severity of aggravating incidents have been
vague and imprecise. The fairly common provisions increasing the
maximum penalty under various statutes to life imprisonment "if
153. Plea bargaining, of course, might also be seen as advantage by a large number of
defendants who would prefer to have the opportunity to plead guilty to a lesser offense.
154. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIM tiu- STANDARDS FOR CIMINAL
JUsTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY (Tent. Draft 1967). adopted as amended,
2 CiuM. L. REp. 2422 (1968); THE PRFSIDFNT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEfENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JusTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT. THE COURTS 12 (1967).
155. CODE § 3204(3).
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death results," 156 for example, do not differentiate among degrees of
culpability; the punishment is the same whether the death is negli.
gently caused or viciously planned. Even the somewhat more carefully
drafted bank robbery statute'5 7 rather arbitrarily establishes an addi-
tional sentence of up to twenty-five years for any associated assault,
regardless of its nature, and provides for life imprisonment when the
offender "kills" someone, again without respect to the degree of cul-
pability. The replacement of such provisions by the piggybacking of
carefully defined offenses would assure defendants that the government
will have to charge and prove separately each item of conduct that
aggravates the punishment, and that the resulting sentence will be at
least roughly proportional to the seriousness of the conduct involved.
VI. Conclusion: The Alternatives to Piggybacking
There are at least three broad alternatives to piggyback jurisdiction.
Each would fulfill essentially the same function, though each is in cer-
tain respects inferior to piggybacking.
First, piggybacking could be replaced by more conventional tech-
niques for dealing with compound offenses. The most obvious ap-
proach would be to provide increased penalties for individual offenses
when associated with various forms of aggravating conduct. For ex-
ample, the crime of robbery could be defined so as to be punishable
by more severe sentences when accompanied by aggravated assault or
murder, as in the present bank robbery statute. Reference could be
made, in turn, to a separate set of definitions for such common forms
of aggravating conduct as assault, murder, and theft, thus eliminating
inconsistencies of definition and assuring that all the requisite ele-
ments of the conduct, including the appropriate degree of culpability,
would be clearly set forth.
Such an approach would not necessarily frustrate the other major
jurisdictional innovation in the Code-the separation of jurisdictional
bases from definitions of criminal conduct-and it would permit a
more selective approach to the extension of federal jurisdiction over
incidental offenses. 158 On the other hand, the resulting definitions of
156. See p. 1214 supra.
157. See p. 1214 supra.
158. Note that a combination of this approach and the piggyback proposal Is also
possible; in place of CODE § 201(b), the jurisdictional provision for any given offense In
chapters 16 or 17 could contain a statement that there is jurisdiction over that offense
whenever it is committed "in the course of committing" any of a set of crimes which Is
explicitly listed. Thus, different offenses could be given piggyback jurisdiction of different
scope.
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offenses might be exceedingly cumbersome,159 and, no matter how care-
fully drafted, they would almost certainly be unable to avoid situa-
tions, characteristic of the present law, in which various incidents with-
in a given transaction are not appropriately covered by the definitions.
Furthermore, such an approach would leave open the possibility of in-
consistent or less carefully drafted future additions and hence of the
re-emergence of the haphazard pattern that characterizes the present
law. 160
As a second alternative, it has been suggested that the practice of
assigning a series of particular jurisdictional bases to individual of-
fenses, followed in both the Code and the existing law, might be elimi-
nated in favor of a single provision making all crimes federally cog-
nizable when committed "within the federal jurisdiction," a phrase
that could be defined to comprehend every desired basis for federal
jurisdiction.161 Although this approach would obviate the need for
special devices for aggravating offenses, it would not eliminate the
problem of defining the unit of behavior-that is, the scope of the
transaction-to which federal jurisdiction would attach.1 2 Further-
more, such an approach could involve a substantial expansion of fed-
eral authority, and consequently pose a far greater threat to the values
of federalism than does piggybacking. 163
159. Presumably the definition of each offense would have to include a reference to
every possible aggravating offense. In some cases, for example where the offense is imper-
sonation of a federal officer, this might extend to nearly every offense now contained in
chapters 16 and 17 of the Code. Providing for an appropriate sentence in such definitions
could be an especially difficult problem. Thus, if impersonation could be aggravated by
the act of theft, there would have to be some provision for adjusting the sentence accord-
ing to the character of the theft-a problem that requires almost two full pages in CODE §
1735, the provision that covers grading of theft offenses in chapter 17. Of course, such
sentencing provisions could be stated separately and incorporated by reference. Yet
the more such devices are employed, the closer this approach resembles the pigg)back
technique.
160. See p. 1211 supra.
161. Schwartz, supra note 18. Professor Schwartz offered the following definition for
the phrase as a subject of discussion for the Commission:
Federal jurisdiction exists if-
(i) Federal facilities were employed at any stage of the offense;
(ii) the Federal government or any of its agencies, property, personnel, functions,
or interests was harmed or imperiled by the behavior;
(iii) the offense occurred in Federal territory;
(iv) the offense occurred on a vessel... ;
(v) the offense infringed upon a federal statutory or constitutional right;
(vi) by reason of any other circumstance in the case Federal prosecution would be
constitutionally permissible.
Abrams, Consultant's Report on Jurisdiction, 1 WORKING PAtrmes 33, 50.
162. In the jurisdictional provision quoted in note 161 supra, for example. there
would still be a need to define such words as "offense." "behavior," and "case.'
163. The breadth of the resulting jurisdiction would of course depend on the particu-
lar definition used. If clause (vi) of the definition in note 161 supra were omitted, for
example, the result would be muc, the same as if the Code were simply altered to pro.
vide for jurisdiction over all offenses under every jurisdictional base set forth in section
201.
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A third alternative would be to provide for "true" pendent criminal
jurisdiction-that is, to permit prosecution of state offenses in federal
court whenever they are included within the same transaction as a
federal offense. 0 4 This approach would permit a great deal of flexi-
bility in framing an indictment, while at the same time respecting the
right of each state to write its own criminal law. Yet it has the obvious
disadvantage of requiring the application of two or more systems of
criminal law to a single transaction.' 6
The proposal for piggyback jurisdiction essentially captures the best
of each of these alternatives. It permits continuation of the particular-
istic treatment of jurisdictional bases and aggravating offenses, pro-
vides for the application of a single body of federal law to the entirety
of a criminal transaction, limits federal jurisdiction to only those of-
fenders already subject to federal prosecution, and assures sufficient
authority and flexibility to prosecute all the offenses involved in a
given transaction.
164. The result would still differ from the form of pendent jurisdiction employed In
civil litigation in that it could provide for appending an additional party-the state-
without first obtaining that party's consent, and without letting that party represent itself.
Even this result is not unprecedented, however. The pendent jurisdiction rule of Gibbs,
pp. 1220-21 supra, has been held to extend to pendent parties, see Astor-Honor, Inc, v.
Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971), and under FED. R. Civ. '. 24 (Inter.
vention) an individual does not always have the right to represent his own interests lit ail
action in federal court.
165. See p. 1222 supra.
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